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Abstract 
While conventional approaches to fiscal decentralization suggest that decentralization lowers the 
power of redistribution among regions, recent theories argue that fiscal decentralization works as a 
commitment device. In this manner, where the budget in a given region is highly dependent on 
transfers from the central government, there is an incentive for effort following fiscal 
decentralization. The former effect is argued to increase regional inequality, while the latter suggests 
a decrease in regional inequality. However no known empirical work has directly examined the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional inequality. In this paper, cross-sectional 
data for the United States, excluding the convergence of regional income, are used to derive the net 
relationship. It is also the case that the direction of this effect on regional inequality depends on how 
fiscal decentralization is promoted. While the former distribution effect directly depends on the 
central government’s share of power, the latter incentive effect depends on autonomy. Two measures 
that represent the power of the central government and autonomy are used to identify these effects. 
The results indicate that local expenditure or revenue share in fiscal decentralization has no 
significant effect on regional inequality, while the achievement of autonomy by fiscal 
decentralization has a negative effect on regional inequality. This supports the theory that fiscal 
decentralization works as a commitment device. The results also show that how fiscal 
decentralization is promoted is important for how it impacts on regional inequality.   
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1. Introduction 
Fiscal decentralization, or the devolution of fiscal responsibilities to lower levels of government, has 
recently focused on its role for good governance (see, for example, Oates (1993)). While this 
viewpoint of fiscal decentralization concerns its efficiency benefits, another view of fiscal 
decentralization argues that fiscal decentralization may increase regional inequality (disparity) 
because the centralized fiscal system is needed to establish public infrastructures for all regions and 
reduces regional inequality, especially at the development stage (Prud’homme (1995)). After 
combining the efficiency and equity effects, the total social welfare effect of fiscal decentralization is 
more ambiguous. Conversely, and as discussed in McKinnon (1995) and Qian and Weingast (1997), 
more recent theoretical work that focuses on fiscal decentralization as a commitment device suggests 
that regional inequality may be related to the efficiency of public services, and that ex ante fiscal 
decentralization may not only contribute to enhanced efficiency, but also reduce ex post regional 
inequality.  
In a centralized fiscal system, it is possible to redistribute resources from rich to poor regions. 
This reduces regional inequality in the ex post sense. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
regional inequality becomes smaller when compared with ex ante regional inequality when the 
dynamic incentive effect of regions is considered. For example, bailout policies for the ex post poor 
region through the redistribution of resources from the central government may soften its budget and 
distort the ex ante incentive of regions that become poor ex post without any effort, but can escape 
with effort. In this situation, fiscal decentralization, which involves the devolution of government 
fiscal responsibilities to lower levels of government, may work as a commitment device not to bail 
out the ex post poor region and provides an incentive for regions that have power to escape being 
poor. This suggests that hard budgets from fiscal decentralization reduce regional inequality by 
enhancing the incentive for efficient public policy for those regions that can escape from being poor 3 
by their own effort. If this holds, regional inequality may become smaller after fiscal 
decentralization. 
However, it should be noted that the reduction in regional inequality should be distinguished 
from the convergence of inequality as a nation develops. The difference is that in the former the 
driving force reducing inequality is not national development, rather it is the commitment of 
government policy. Even if a nation fully develops, inequality is not reduced as long as the 
commitment device is not incorporated (this can be proven, in part, from the fact that regional 
inequality remains in developed countries). 
If this theory concerning credibility is correct, a new hypothesis that fiscal decentralization as 
a commitment device reduces regional inequality can be put forward. In order to test this hypothesis, 
it is important to use a desirable data set, which can exclude the convergence effect in the 
development stage. The current paper is a first step in empirically examining this hypothesis and 
uses a desirable data set for a single country at the same stage of development. The data used are 
state-level cross-sectional data for the United States, which enables us to estimate how fiscal 
decentralization at the same developed stage affects regional inequality in an objective manner. 
The issue of regional inequality has been analyzed in a number of economic fields, including 
urban–regional economics and macroeconomics. First, regional economics has focused on regional 
disparity of income as the result of differing patterns of urbanization and economic development. 
For instance, Williamson (1965) first examined the pattern of variation in the spatial distribution of 
regional incomes using Kuznets’ inverted-U hypothesis, showing that regional income inequality 
increases in the earliest phases of economic development, and then decreases as economic 
development progresses. Several papers have extended this type of analysis by considering 
additional factors related to urbanization.
2 However, this body of work has mainly focused on the 
relationship between regional disparity and urban development, rather than the system of fiscal 
                                                  
2 For recent empirical studies, see the special issue of Annals of Regional Science 35(1). For example, 
Fujita and Hu (2001) estimate trends in regional disparity during the period 1985–1994, from the aspects 
of both income distribution and production agglomeration by using GDP and industry output data.   4 
institutions. 
Second, regional inequality has also been examined in research concerning income 
convergence among regions, as developed in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). The purpose of this 
work is to examine the relationship between income growth and the initial income level (the level of 
economic development). Such research associated with convergence is then regarded as the factor 
analysis of economic growth by using economic factors in each region, rather than the factor 
analysis of inequality by using common economic factors for all regions. Only a few studies have 
examined the effect of fiscal institutions on regional inequality (in what the authors regard as a 
somewhat partial manner), and no empirical work has comprehensively examined the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and regional inequality. The only other known works that examine 
fiscal decentralization, at least in part, are Shankar and Shar (2003), Kim, Hong and Ha (2003) and 
Kanbur and Zhang (2002). Whereas Shankar and Shar (2003) found a positive correlation between 
regional inequality and decentralization, they examined only unconditional correlation. Since many 
other factors are highly correlated with both variables, problems associated with omitted variable 
bias are likely to be high. A second paper by Kim, Hong and Ha (2003) concluded that systems with 
decentralization have higher  rates of regional inequality using Korean time series data from 
1971–1997. However, the measure of decentralization used in that study is the spatial distribution of 
public services, which may not accurately reflect the true decentralization of power and resources in 
a given country. In addition, it is difficult to differentiate these changes from trends in regional 
income convergence. The third paper, by Kanbur and Zhang (2002), examines the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on inequality among Chinese provinces during the period 1952–1999. However, this 
study included the effect of regional income convergence. 
In this paper, we provide a more systematic examination of the real relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and regional inequality by (1) using an appropriate data set to obtain the net 
commitment effect of decentralization, and (2) focusing on the quality of fiscal decentralization. 
First, since we focus on the effect of fiscal decentralization on regional inequality rather than 5 
convergence of income among regions, it is generally better to use data at the same stage of 
economic development, especially in a developed economy. This implies that cross-sectional, rather 
than time-series, data is more desirable. However, with cross-country data in which cultural, 
historical and institutional differences between developing and developed countries are substantial, it 
may be difficult to determine the true effect of fiscal decentralization unless adjustments are made to 
account for these differences. On this basis, data from the fifty US states are appropriate since there 
are no substantial historical or cultural differences across observations.   
Second, it also appears that the direction of fiscal decentralization’s effect on regional 
inequality depends on how it is promoted. While the distribution effect directly depends on the 
power share of the central government as described by the orthodox approach to fiscal 
decentralization, the incentive effect depends on autonomy as a new hypothesis. It may be possible 
to discriminate these two effects by defining the measure of fiscal decentralization in several ways. 
In this paper, by using two types of measures that represent the power of the central government 
(Authority power) and autonomy (Autonomy power), we examine the two opposing effects in the 
same regression. Finally, we estimate the relationship in a number of ways, including (1) various 
measures of regional inequality, (2) several measures of fiscal decentralization,
3 and (3) taking 
account of the problem of endogeneity.   
The results indicate that fiscal decentralization measured by the power share of the central 
government may not reduce regional inequality, while fiscal decentralization as a commitment 
device may lower measured regional inequality. The results in some of the regressions are 
statistically significant and robust within a wide range of specification. Our results also suggest that 
the equity effect of decentralization through the efficiency effect created by commitment persists 
when decentralization occurs, and this may be the opposite of that conventionally put forward. Our 
                                                  
3  In previous work, only one measure of fiscal decentralization is used. For example, Kanbur and Zhang 
(2002) specify the revenue share of the sub-national government. However this single measure may not 
necessarily represent a true measure of fiscal decentralization. The current paper adopts several measures 
reflecting various views of fiscal decentralization. See Appendix A for more detail.   6 
work supports the idea that the continuing trend of fiscal decentralization toward greater autonomy 
may be justified not only on efficiency grounds, but also on considerations of equity.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates four indicators of 
fiscal decentralization and describes the combination of hypotheses and indicators. Section 3 
describes the variables used in the analyses. In Section 4 we provide the regression results 
concerning the relationship between regional inequality and fiscal decentralization. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Conventional and New Measures of Fiscal Decentralization and 
Related Hypotheses 
 
In order to capture the incentive effect of fiscal decentralization, we need to construct an effective 
measure of fiscal decentralization. In other words, we separate measures into those measuring the 
power of authority, which corresponds to the conventional discussion, and those concerning 
autonomy, which affects the incentives of local government. Definitions of the measures of authority 
and autonomy are as follows. 
 
2.1 Indicators that Measure Authority Power 
Generally, fiscal decentralization is interpreted as devolution of the authority associated with 
decision-making to a lower level of government. The authority associated with decision-making is 
usually allocated on the basis of legal relationships between these higher and lower levels of 
government. However, it is difficult to quantitatively measure the allocation of authority. Earlier 
work has suggested indicators based on the relative size of revenue or expenditure to represent the 
allocation of authority. When the grantor directs in detail the purposes for which the funds are to be 
used, the grants should be attributed to the level of government that collects the revenues. 7 
We provide three indicators measuring the authority power of local government,  RI (revenue 
share),  PI (expenditure share) and  PRI (average between revenue and expenditure shares), which 
represent the relative fiscal size between state and local governments (detailed explanation of these 
indicators is presented in Appendix A). As these measures of authority power fall, the power of local 
government associated with decision making on the allocation of resources decreases. In other words, 
political and financial powers concentrate more in the authority of the single central government. 
Because one of the main policies of central government is to reduce inequality, it is easy for central 
governments to carry out a redistribution policy in the centralized environment. Consequently, fiscal 
decentralization lowers the power of redistribution and increases regional inequality. Therefore, 
these indicators may capture the effect most conventionally proposed, that fiscal decentralization 
lowers the power of redistribution and increases regional inequality. 
 
2.2 Indicators that Measure Autonomy Power 
We next consider the incentive effect achieved by the autonomy of local government. Even if the 
expenditure or revenue shares described above are small, autonomy may be fiscally decentralized in 
that sufficient resources for public spending are originally allocated to the lower level of government. 
Thus, local government’s autonomy is high if all fiscal needs are financed in the local government 
region, in which authority may be fiscally decentralized. Conventional indicators of fiscal 
decentralization are not able to reflect this condition. Therefore, we specify other indicators 
representing autonomy: that is, how public spending at the lower level of government is maintained 
by its own revenue (the degree of fiscal independence). 
It is assumed that autonomy corresponds to the degree of accountability or commitment (or 
the degree of a hard budget constraint). We should be able to catch such an effect as a commitment 
device by  AI  ( Autonomy power), defined as the local government’s own revenue share of total 
revenue (a more detailed explanation of this indicator is presented in Appendix A). 8 
This indicator corresponds to the grants share (the share of grant revenue in total revenue) 
subtracted from unity. When this falls, the local government obtains proportionately more grants 
from the central government (a soft budget), and this may distort the incentive for increasing 
regional income by reducing efforts in the conduct of efficient public policy. Therefore, this indicator 
is used to estimate the effect of fiscal decentralization as a commitment device on regional inequality, 
and especially to test the new hypothesis that fiscal decentralization decreases regional inequality. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis   
The primary aim of this paper is to estimate the relationship between regional inequality and fiscal 
decentralization. The analysis begins by presenting the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates using 
cross-sectional, time-series data. The analysis then uses Two Stage Least Square (TSLS) estimates in 
order to consider the problem of endogeneity. Finally, an alternative inequality index is employed as 
a check of the robustness of the results. 
 
3.1 Empirical Model 
This section presents simple cross-sectional regressions of the form: 
, 1 0 i i i i X on ntralizati FiscalDece Inequality ε β α α + + + =   i  (=  1,…,50)    
  (1) 
where  i refers to state I,  i Inequality   represents degree of regional inequality, 
i on ntralizati FiscalDece  represents indicators of fiscal decentralization described in Section 2, 
and Xi is a vector of control variables comprising state characteristics. The parameters  0 α  and  1 α  
are scalars,  β  represents a parameter vector, and  i ε  is the error term, which is assumed to be 
normally distributed, homoscedastic, and independent across observations. 
We divide fiscal decentralization into two factors; Autonomy power, as measured by  AI , and 9 
Authority power, as described in Section 2 and measured by  RI ,  PI  and PRI .  
Therefore, we rewrite equation (1) as:   
i i i i i b X power Autonomy a power Authority a a Inequality υ + + + + = ɹ ɹ 2 1 0
    (2) 
By including two different qualities of decentralization indicators, we consider the various effects of 
fiscal decentralization. If the coefficient of  AI  is negative, it may indicate that dependency on 
subsidies increases regional inequality. This then shows that achieved autonomy gives strong 
incentives to the poor region to improve income, and regional inequality falls. If the estimated 
coefficient for RI ,  PI  or  PRI  is positive, it suggests that the conventional discussion is 
supported and fiscal decentralization increases regional inequality. 
 
3.2 Data and Variables 
As discussed earlier, we use state-level cross-sectional data for the United States during the period 
1993–2000 to derive the effect of fiscal decentralization. State-level cross-sectional data is often 
used for the analysis of inequality. We use similar variables specified in this earlier body of work 
(e.g., Al-Samarrie and Miller (1967), Morrill (2000)). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and 
definitions for these variables.   
 
[Table 1 around here.] 
  
First, the measure of inequality used in this paper is the regional income inequality among 
counties in each state. This measure differs from both regional inequality among states and personal 
income inequality as based on micro census data (Partridge, Rickman and Levernier (1996), Morrill
ʢ2000ʣ, Lynch (2003)) . As a measure of regional inequality in each state, we use the GINI 
coefficient calculated from pre-tax income in each county. This measure has been widely used in 10 
previous studies in this area (e.g., McGillivray and Matthew (1991) and others). The index ranges 
from 0 indicating perfect equality to 1 representing perfect inequality. We calculate the index using 
pre-tax personal income per capita for counties within each state from USA Counties, published by 
the US Census Bureau over the period 1993–2000. 
Second, we introduce several explanatory variables to explain the regional inequality within 
each state. By including a large number of each state’s socio-economic characteristics in the 
empirical model, it is possible to capture most effects on regional inequality by controlling for 
differences across states. Most of the explanatory variables used are similar to those in previous 
work in this area. However, in addition to the variables normally used, we include a number of 
additional factors. The regional inequality function incorporates fiscal, geographical, political and 
economic factors for the period 1992–1999. A list of these variables follows. All variables specified 
incorporate one-period lagged values in order to remove any potential endogeneity.   
z  Fiscal Decentralization (RI ,PI ,PRI , ᶗ AI ); See Appendix A for details;
4 
z  Real Gross State Products per capita (GSP per capita, Square of GSP per capita);  
z  Population mobility factor, measured by highway mileage (mile)
5 per area (square mile) 
(Highway per area);  
z  Human agglomeration, measured by the ratio of metropolitan population to total population 
(Metropolitan Rate); 
z  Human capital level and labor quality, measured by the level of Education (Education);  
z  Industrial structure, measured by the share of GSP in both construction and manufacturing 
industries to nominal GSP (Manufacture);  
z  Political effects, measured by Liberal vs. Conservative tendencies (the share of the seats in the 
                                                  
4  Since the estimates of the models where fiscal autonomy (
ᶗ AI
) includes or excludes federal grants are 
similar, only the results for the latter specification are reported.  
5  Immigrant includes persons who may have entered the United States as non-immigrants or refugees.   11 
state legislature held by Democrats) (LIB vs. CON);  
z  Globalization, measured by the share of foreign direct investment
6  to nominal GSP (Foreign 
Direct Investment);  
z  Economic stability effect, measured by percent unemployed of the civilian labor force 
(Unemployment Rate);  
z  Regional size effect, measured by the level of state’s population (Population).  
All variables are specified in natural logarithms and all data is obtained from USA Counties 
and the Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years). 
Predictions for the effects of these socio-economic variables can be made on the basis of 
earlier work:   
1.  Kuznets’ inverted U-hypothesis suggests that regional income differentials increase in 
early development stages, then stabilize in mature periods on growth (Kuznets inverted the 
U-curve). Williamson (1965) provides a number of reasons why regional inequality may 
decrease in the latter stages of development. For example, government policies aimed at 
equalizing regional growth rates and income inequality levels, discovery of new resources 
in less developed regions, etc. On the other hand, Amos (1988) highlights two patterns of 
the inequality–regional development nexus, each based on the simple neoclassical factor 
market equilibrating mechanism. The first pattern is based on the conventional stabilization 
effects. In proposing his second pattern, Amos questions whether regional inequality will 
in fact stabilize during the latter stage of development, as it would be naïve to expect 
regional growth rates to equalize and relative per capita incomes to remain unchanged, 
given the often dynamic nature of regional growth. In such an environment, Amos 
proposes the so-called “augmented inverted U,” where a simple increase–decrease inverted 
U is replaced with a pattern of increase–decrease–increase. The second pattern would be 
plausible if the economy, even after development, had not stabilized. On this basis, the 
                                                  
6  Foreign direct investment is the gross book value of foreign company US affiliates by State. 12 
coefficients of GSP per capita and Square of GSP per capita could be positive or 
negative. 
2.  The change of accessibility to the interior could contribute to a decrease in the cost of 
transportation. As a result, agglomeration of industry occurs and the productivity in a 
region changes because firms desire good access to the products of other firms. Dunford 
(1996) argued that regional disparity depended on spatial productivity and employment 
rate. The development of infrastructure would affect the structure of residents’ wages 
through changes in regional productivity. Therefore, the estimated coefficient on Highway 
per area could be positive or negative. 
3.  Since urbanization is often regarded as a measure of economic development, greater 
metropolitan share should reduce income inequality (Kuznets (1955)). However, if the 
prevalence of service-producing industries with a bimodal wage distribution is centered in 
metropolitan areas, a positive metropolitan inequality relationship is expected (Partridge, 
Rickman and Levernier (1996)). A positive or negative coefficient is hypothesized for the 
Metropolitan Rate. 
4.  As discussed in Partridge, Rickman and Levernier (1996), human capital promoted by 
education has two effects. While the prevalence of low-level education in all regions 
decreases regional inequality keeping high-level education constant, the prevalence of 
high-level education in all regions increases it. The expected sign of Education is unclear.   
5.  Kuznets suggested that farm-based economies had greater income inequality, and that a 
greater share of the labor-force employed in manufacturing is negatively associated with 
income inequality. A negative relationship between manufacturing’s share of the labor 
force and income inequality is plausible because manufacturing may provide less-skilled 
workers the opportunity to earn greater wages (Borjas and Ramey (1994)). The expected 
sign of Manufacture is negative.   
6.  As suggested by Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), when an economy opens up to 13 
world markets, regional inequality will be affected. Globalization of the economy can 
change internal comparative advantage and hence location patterns. However the effect of 
globalization varies. The expected sign of Foreign Direct Investment is unclear.   
 
Although it is difficult to predict the effects of the remaining variables—Economic stability 
effect (Unemployment Rate), Political effect (LIB vs. CON), and Regional size effect 
(Population)—on regional inequality, they are included in the model to capture other political or 
regional influences.   
 
4. Regression Results 
 
4.1 Basic Results 
We first provide basic results from the OLS regression using data on the 50 US states. We estimate 
four models: (1) a basic model; (2) one including a time dummy; (3) another including a regional 
dummy; and (4) another including both time and regional dummies. We adopt a regional dummy
7 to 
consider specific characteristics among regions in the United States.
8  The results are shown in Table 
2. The coefficients of both dummies are not shown due to space limitations.   
 
                                                  
7 Regional dummies were constructed by dividing the 50 US states into eight regions: Region 1 = 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont; Region 2 = Delaware, 
Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania; Region 3 = Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio; Region 4 
= Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin; Region 5 = 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia; Region 6 = Arizona, New Mexico, Texas; Region 7 = 
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming; Region 8 = Alaska, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, 
Washington. 
8  Formally, we may estimate the effect of fiscal decentralization considering state fixed effects. However 
it should be noted that the state fixed effect is highly correlated with the fiscal decentralization measure in 
each state because there is little variation in the fiscal decentralization measure across time. This 
multicollinearity distorts estimates of the real effect of fiscal decentralization from its cross-state variation. 
In order to avoid this problem, we use regional dummies instead of state dummies. 14 
[Table 2 around here.] 
 
Regarding Authority power, we cannot find any significant effect of fiscal decentralization on 
regional inequality. This result shows that the change of redistribution that may be created by the 
decrease of the power of central government is not so large and does not affect regional inequality.   
As for Autonomy power,  we have negative and significant coefficients of fiscal 
decentralization on regional inequality in all models. When fiscal decentralization increases by 1%, 
regional inequality decreases from –0.51% to –0.25%. This shows the positive relationship between 
fiscal decentralization as a commitment device and regional inequality, which is consistent with our 
hypothesis that fiscal decentralization as a commitment device reduces regional inequality.   
Concerning the estimated coefficient of other state characteristics, some conclusions emerge. 
We discuss these based on the results obtained using the pooled data. Most of the variables 
significantly affect regional inequality. Detailed discussion follows.
9 
First, the significant and positive coefficient on GSP per capita shows that regions in highly 
developed states experience higher levels of inequality. The estimated coefficient of Square of GSP 
per capita is also positive and significant. As discussed in Section 3, this result is different from the 
conventional theory of Kuznets’ inverted U with a high level of development, but is consistent with 
the theory developed by Amos (1988) and McGillivray and Matthew’s (1991) analysis of Australian 
regional inequality. This is also consistent with the findings of Partridge et al. (1996) concerning US 
state income inequality, which suggest that there is some evidence that at a very advanced stage of 
economic development, income inequality and average income are positively related.   
Second, the estimated coefficient of Highway per area is negative and significant. This result 
is interpreted as suggesting that development of transportation yields industrial agglomeration and 
                                                  
9 Although we also included the ratio of population aged over 65 years to total population, the share of 
local and state government education expenditure to total expenditure, and a dummy variable for 
Proposition 13 as explanatory variables to capture local characteristics, none of the estimated coefficients 
were statistically significant. 15 
improvement of productivity within the region. As a consequence, regional inequality is reduced. 
Third, the estimated coefficient of Metropolitan Rate is negative and significant, which shows that 
agglomeration reduces regional inequality, similar to Morrill’s (2000) conclusions on US state 
income inequality. Fourth, the estimated coefficient of Education is negative and significant, except 
for models including regional dummies. This result is similar to the findings of Partridge et al. 
(1996) and Al-Samarrie and Miller (1992), both of which conclude that inequality falls when 
accompanied by higher amounts of education. 
Fifth, the estimated coefficient of Manufacture is negative and significant, as expected. This 
correlation is consistent with the findings of Morrill (2000) using US data in the 1970s. Sixth, the 
estimated coefficient of Foreign Direct Investment is negative and significant. This is inconsistent 
with the findings of Fujita and Hu (2001) in China. Finally the results show that the Economic 
stability effect (Unemployment Rate), Political effect (LIB vs. CON) and Regional size effect 
(Population) also significantly impact upon regional inequality. Importantly, the results provide 
convincing evidence that fiscal decentralization as a commitment device may contribute to a 
decrease in regional inequality.   
 
4.2 Consideration of Endogeneity of Decentralization Measures 
In this section, we consider some potential problems in previous OLS estimations and provide 
corrected estimation results. 
When we use cross-sectional data, especially in a single country, the estimations suffer from 
endogeneity bias between regional inequality and the Autonomy indicator ( AI ). In order to provide 
correct estimates, we estimate the effect of fiscal decentralization by considering endogeneity and 
correct for these potential problems using TSLS.
10 Table 3 presents the results as estimated by 
                                                  
10  We add two instrumental variables to the exogenous variables already included in the basic regression 
model. These are the White rate (ratio of the white population to the total population) and Government 
size (the ratio of state and local governments’ expenditure to nominal GSP). Two tests are used to 
examine the validity of this particular set of instruments (Horiuchi (2002)). First, an F test of the null 16 
TSLS. 
 
[Table 3 around here.] 
 
The new results by TSLS method are almost the same as the results discussed in section 4.1. 
Namely, that the fact that fiscal decentralization does not necessarily increase regional inequality and 
may in fact reduce it holds after considering the problem of endogeneity. 
 
4.3 Robust Check: Another Measure of Regional Inequality 
In the previous section, we adopt the GINI coefficient as a measure of the regional inequality. In 
order to test the robustness of these results we add the Coefficient of Variation (CV), which is one of 
the most widely used measures of regional inequality (e.g., Shankar and Shah (2003)) and is similar 
































where  i x  is the personal income per capita of the  i th county, and  n  is the number of counties 
within a state. The larger CV is, the larger the disparity among regions. The correlation coefficient is 
0.93 between Coefficient of Variation and GINI Coefficient in this paper. Table 4 provides the results 
obtained with the pooled data. 
                                                                                                                                                  
hypothesis that the coefficients on the instrumental variables in the first-stage regression are jointly zero. 
High values of the F statistics suggest that the set of instrumental variables is valid. Table 3 shows the 
result of the F test. The values in all the regression models are highly significant. The second more 
appropriate test is an nR
2 test. The test statistic is the number of observations multiplied by R
2 from a 
regression of the residuals from the second-stage regression on both the included and excluded exogenous 
variables. The null hypothesis is that the instrument set contains no variables that should be included. The 
low value infers a valid model. Table 3 shows the results of the nR
2 test where the P-values are high. 
Therefore, we recognize the validity of the instrumental variables used.   17 
 
[Table 4 around here.] 
 
As shown, the coefficient of Autonomy power is negative and significant in all models. This 




The effect of fiscal decentralization on regional inequality has been a major focus of debate in the 
context of recent public reforms. The convention is that fiscal decentralization may increase regional 
inequality because the power of redistribution as a nation becomes lower after fiscal decentralization. 
On the other hand, the theory based on the role as a commitment device of fiscal decentralization 
suggests the opposite relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional inequality.   
This paper has estimated the real effect of fiscal decentralization using an appropriate data set 
and several indicators of fiscal decentralization. As a result, we have presented new empirical 
evidence that fiscal decentralization as a commitment device may reduce regional inequality. As 
discussed, our data set is one in which differences relating to history, culture, and the stage of 
economic development are minimized, and hence is admirably suited to determining the true effect 
of fiscal decentralization as a commitment device on regional inequality. This distortion-free data set 
has revealed the truly negative effect of fiscal decentralization on regional inequality. 18 
 
Appendix A: Specification of Fiscal Decentralization 
 
Definition of measures 
Revenue Indicator   
The Revenue Indicator (RI ) is defined for each state as the ratio of local government revenue to 
combined state and local government revenue.
11  This indicator corresponds to the most approximate 
measure of the allocation of authority when the government that collects revenue has authority 
associated with its own revenue (the tax to be collected and the type of expenditure to be made), but 
all intergovernmental grants are conditional or matching grants. In calculating revenue share, we use 
government revenue excluding grants from other governments. 
 
Production Indicator   
The  Production Indicator ( PI )  is defined as the ratio of local government expenditure to 
combined state and local government expenditure. This indicator corresponds to the most 
approximate measure of the allocation of authority when a local government has authority associated 
with its expenditure (the tax to be collected and the type of expenditure to be made) implicitly 
considering that all intergovernmental grants are non-matching or lump-sum grants. In calculating 
expenditure share, we use government expenditure including grants from other governments. 
 
Production–Revenue Indicator   
The indicators defined above are regarded as extreme cases regarding the allocation of authority. For 
the middle case, an indicator that combines these is considered. The Production–Revenue 
                                                  
11  In order to grasp the concept of authority allocation most accurately, we exclude revenues financed by 
public debt from both state and local revenue data. 19 
Indicator ( PRI ) represents a decentralization measure that incorporates both revenue and 
expenditure shares. The normalized indicator is defined as the mean of  RI and  PI ; that is, PRI = 
() 2 / RI PI + .  
 
Autonomy Indicator   
The Autonomy Indicator ( AI ) is defined as the local government’s own revenue share of its total 
revenue. In calculating the autonomy of local government in a state, the federal grant provided from 
outside the state is considered. Hence, we consider two indicators for  AI  to account for the 
potential impact of federal grants.  ᶗ AI   represents the local government’s real fiscal independence 
and is based on the local government’s own revenue and total revenue, excluding federal grants. 
ᶘ AI   represents actual independence from the state government, and is based on the local 
government’s own revenue and the total revenue, including federal grants.   
 
Correlation between fiscal decentralization indicators and degree of fiscal decentralization by state 
(average data during 1992–1999) are summarized in Tables A.1 and A.2, respectively. 
 
Table A.1: Correlation Coefficient between Fiscal Decentralization Indicators (1992–1999) 
Correlation matrix 
This table shows the correlations between the five decentralization indicators. It is apparent that  RI , 
PI  and PRI  are highly correlated with each other. However,  ᶗ AI   and  ᶘ AI   are less correlated 
1992-1999 RI PI PRI AIᶗ AIᶘ
RI 1.000
PI 0.847 1.000
PRI 0.966 0.956 1.000
AIᶗ 0.497 0.151 0.348 1.000
AIᶘ 0.562 0.218 0.417 0.990 1.00020 
with the remaining indicators. 
 
Table A.2: Degree of Fiscal Decentralization by State (average data during 1992–1999) 
Average value
during 1992-1999 RI PI PRI AI1 AI2
Alabama 0.400 0.450 0.425 0.691 0.668
Alaska 0.197 0.316 0.256 0.662 0.630
Arizona 0.451 0.521 0.486 0.668 0.645
Arkansas 0.301 0.376 0.339 0.600 0.585
California 0.435 0.520 0.477 0.615 0.596
Colorado 0.482 0.541 0.511 0.755 0.734
Connecticut   0.353 0.392 0.372 0.731 0.709
Delaware 0.210 0.313 0.261 0.575 0.557
Florida 0.497 0.550 0.524 0.745 0.723
Georgia 0.485 0.513 0.499 0.737 0.719
Hawaii 0.205 0.225 0.215 0.885 0.817
Idaho 0.313 0.421 0.367 0.603 0.587
Illinois   0.471 0.507 0.489 0.737 0.707
Indiana 0.421 0.475 0.448 0.671 0.658
Iowa 0.398 0.459 0.429 0.671 0.651
Kansas 0.450 0.499 0.475 0.704 0.693
Kentucky 0.300 0.376 0.338 0.631 0.610
Louisiana   0.389 0.411 0.400 0.687 0.664
Maine 0.346 0.380 0.363 0.705 0.681
Maryland 0.401 0.445 0.423 0.744 0.713
Massachusetts      0.368 0.414 0.391 0.684 0.652
Michigan 0.366 0.465 0.416 0.605 0.588
Minnesota      0.380 0.493 0.436 0.633 0.616
Mississippi 0.367 0.427 0.397 0.613 0.593
Missouri   0.407 0.468 0.438 0.720 0.698
Montana 0.298 0.363 0.331 0.632 0.597
Nebraska 0.560 0.562 0.561 0.822 0.803
Nevada 0.369 0.508 0.439 0.635 0.613
New Hampshire     0.463 0.428 0.446 0.873 0.853
New Jersey 0.380 0.441 0.410 0.688 0.67721 




New Mexico 0.243 0.373 0.308 0.502 0.479
New York 0.501 0.526 0.513 0.707 0.687
North Carolina  0.393 0.480 0.436 0.652 0.635
North Dakota 0.312 0.368 0.340 0.651 0.612
Ohio 0.351 0.443 0.397 0.679 0.656
Oklahoma 0.349 0.424 0.386 0.654 0.636
Oregon 0.361 0.461 0.411 0.672 0.629
Pennsylvania 0.372 0.446 0.409 0.675 0.644
Rhode Island 0.312 0.327 0.320 0.736 0.703
South Carolina 0.373 0.405 0.389 0.704 0.684
South Dakota  0.404 0.431 0.417 0.773 0.737
Tennessee 0.544 0.535 0.539 0.791 0.774
Texas 0.482 0.522 0.502 0.737 0.718
Utah   0.399 0.458 0.429 0.708 0.684
Vermont 0.356 0.360 0.358 0.725 0.700
Virginia 0.394 0.474 0.434 0.715 0.694
Washington 0.375 0.472 0.424 0.675 0.655
West Virginia  0.268 0.331 0.299 0.566 0.552
Wisconsin 0.331 0.482 0.406 0.596 0.583
Wyoming   0.387 0.443 0.415 0.634 0.62122 
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GINI Coefficient 0.099 0.024 Calculated by regional income inequality among
counties in each state
Coefficient of Variation 0.196 0.053 Calculated by regional income inequality among
counties in each state
GSP per capita 150596 178265 Real Gross State Product (GSP) per 1000 persons
Highway per area 1.637 0.986 Ratio of highway mileage to state's total area (mile
2)
Metropolitan Rate 66.917 21.182 Percentage of metropolitan population (%)
Unemployment Rate 5.334 1.515 Ratio of unemployed to the civilian labor force (%)
Education 0.096 0.014 Ratio of high school graduates in total population
aged 18–24 years old
Opennes 5.924 3.725 Ratio of state's exports to other countries and other
states to nominal GSP
Manufacture 0.213 0.066 The share of consolidated gross state product in both
constrution and manufacturing industries to nominal
GSP
LIB vs.CON 0.536 0.157 The share of seats in the state legislature held by
Democrats
Foreign Direct Investment 0.127 0.146 The share of foreign direct investment to nominal
GSP. Foreign direct investmen is gross book value of
US affiliates of foreign companies by state
Population 5345336 5819321 State population
RI 0.379 0.082 Ratio of local government revenue to state and local
government revenue
PI 0.440 0.072 Ratio of local government expenditure to state and
local government expenditure
PRI 0.410 0.074 (PI+RI)/2, which reflects both revenue and
expenditure aspects of fiscal decentralization
AIᶗ 0.685 0.076 Ratio of local government's own revenue to total
revenue, with revenues excluding federal grants
Indicator of fiscal decentralization26 
Table 2: Estimation Result (Inequality = GINI Coefficient) Method = OLS 
Ordinary Least Square Results
Indep. Var.














-0.025 -0.020 -0.107 -0.125 0.014 0.033 -0.100 -0.133 -0.009 0.001 -0.117 -0.143
[0.43] [0.34] [1.81]
* [2.11]
** [0.19] [0.40] [1.42] [1.76]
* [0.13] [0.01] [1.74]
* [2.06]
**














GSP per capita 6.153 6.308 2.617 2.229 6.267 6.462 2.891 2.468 6.224 6.394 2.733 2.310
[3.60]
*** [3.68]







Square of GSP per capita  0.823 0.846 0.304 0.245 0.838 0.867 0.341 0.276 0.832 0.857 0.319 0.254
[3.44]
*** [3.53]
*** [1.36] [1.08] [3.54]
*** [3.63]
*** [1.55] [1.23] [3.50]
*** [3.58]
*** [1.44] [1.13]




























Education -0.248 -0.248 0.060 0.094 -0.239 -0.238 0.074 0.108 -0.243 -0.243 0.065 0.099
[2.86]
*** [2.86]
*** [0.58] [0.90] [2.80]
*** [2.75]
*** [0.74] [1.04] [2.82]
*** [2.80]
*** [0.64] [0.95]






































































Adjusted R-squared 0.532 0.528 0.616 0.616 0.532 0.528 0.615 0.614 0.532 0.528 0.616 0.615
Variables Included in Equation:
  Regional dummy no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes






























Cross-section and time series data Cross-section and time series data Cross-section and time series data
    Note: Figures in parentheses are the absolute values of t-statistics. Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are significant at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) levels, respectively. The sample size is
400. Due to limits on space, we do not report the results for the estimated coefficient of the dummy variables in the table.  Standard Errors are heteroskedastic consistent.27 
Table 3: Estimation Results (Inequality = GINI Coefficient) Method = TSLS 
Two Stage Least Squares Method  
Indep. Var.














0.027 0.031 0.015 -0.011 0.027 0.040 -0.061 -0.108 0.030 0.036 -0.013 -0.046
[0.26] [0.31] [0.18] [0.13] [0.29] [0.43] [0.72] [1.19] [0.29] [0.34] [0.15] [0.52]














GSP per capita 5.922 6.083 2.179 1.820 5.784 6.038 1.578 1.071 5.875 6.083 1.907 1.513
[3.19]
*** [3.23]
*** [1.24] [1.02] [2.57]
*** [2.67]
*** [0.87] [0.58] [3.06]
*** [3.13]
*** [1.08] [0.84]
Square of GSP per capita  0.790 0.813 0.249 0.192 0.771 0.808 0.166 0.087 0.783 0.814 0.212 0.149
[3.04]
*** [3.08]
*** [1.02] [0.77] [2.46]
** [2.55]
** [0.66] [0.34] [2.92]
*** [3.00]
*** [0.86] [0.59]

























Education -0.254 -0.255 0.031 0.069 -0.261 -0.256 -0.009 0.037 -0.256 -0.254 0.014 0.055
[2.77]
*** [2.75]
*** [0.31] [0.67] [2.42]
** [2.39]
** [0.08] [0.35] [2.73]
*** [2.70]
*** [0.13] [0.54]





































































Adjusted R-squared 0.530 0.526 0.604 0.604 0.530 0.527 0.596 0.595 0.530 0.526 0.601 0.601
0.953 1.253 0.548 0.403 0.943 1.269 0.747 0.435 0.94 1.26 0.62 0.42
[.329] [0.26] [0.46] [0.53] [0.33] [0.26] [0.39] [0.51] [0.33] [0.26] [0.43] [0.52]
95.44 100.10 190.03 201.77 26.04 27.61 126.74 134.69 70.80 74.89 192.34 203.46
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
nR-squared (p-value) 0.959 1.285 0.608 0.454 0.916 1.257 0.840 0.500 0.934 1.272 0.690 0.479
[0.33] [0.26] [0.44] [0.50] [0.34] [0.26] [0.36] [0.48] [0.33] [0.26] [0.41] [0.49]
Variables Included in Equation:
  Regional dummy no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes




























Cross-section and time series data Cross-section and time series data Cross-section and time series data
RI PI
    Note: Figures in parentheses are the absolute values of t-statistics. Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are significant at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) levels, respectively. The sample size is 400. Due to
limits on space, we do not report the results for the estimated coefficient of the dummy variables in the table.
Over-identifying restrictions test, P-value
Foreign Direct Investment
F-test statistic for joint significance of
instruments in first stage regression (p-28 
Table 4: Estimation Results (Inequality = CV Coefficient) Method = TSL 
Two Stage Least Squares Method  
Indep. Var.











-0.065 -0.066 -0.002 -0.039 0.010 0.034 -0.060 -0.110 -0.050 -0.049 -0.025 -0.068
[0.60] [0.62] [0.02] [0.47] [0.10] [0.32] [0.68] [1.19] [0.44] [0.43] [0.28] [0.75]
Autonomy Power(AI) -0.402 -0.409 -0.570 -0.551 -0.144 -0.123 -0.667 -0.687 -0.356 -0.355 -0.602 -0.601
[1.50] [1.55] [2.89]
*** [2.86]
*** [0.35] [0.30] [3.68]
*** [3.52]
*** [1.29] [1.31] [3.32]
*** [3.39]
***
GSP per capita 6.537 6.601 2.246 1.755 8.011 8.267 1.818 1.269 6.966 7.069 2.050 1.545
[3.27]
*** [3.26]
*** [1.24] [0.96] [3.23]
*** [3.30]
*** [0.97] [0.67] [3.36]
*** [3.37]
*** [1.13] [0.84]
Square of GSP per capita  0.849 0.858 0.216 0.138 1.053 1.090 0.158 0.070 0.908 0.923 0.190 0.149
[3.04]
*** [3.02]
*** [0.86] [0.54] [3.04]
** [3.11]
*** [0.61] [0.26] [3.13]
*** [3.14]
*** [0.75] [0.59]
























Education -0.274 -0.272 -0.035 0.023 -0.200 -0.193 -0.063 0.003 -0.254 -0.251 -0.047 0.014
[2.78]
*** [2.74]
*** [0.34] [0.22] [1.68]
* [1.63] [0.59] [0.03] [2.50]
*** [2.47]
*** [0.46] [0.14]
































































Adjusted R-squared 0.534 0.530 0.637 0.641 0.509 0.501 0.634 0.637 0.530 0.525 0.636 0.640
0.647 0.823 0.006 0.066 0.533 0.840 0.001 0.057 0.64 0.82 0.00 0.06
 [0.42] [0.37] [0.94] [0.80] [0.47] [0.36] [0.98] [0.81] [0.43] [0.37] [0.97] [0.81]
95.44 100.10 190.03 201.77 26.04 27.61 126.74 134.69 70.80 74.89 192.34 203.46
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
nR-squared (p-value) 0.628 0.812 0.006 0.071 0.529 0.853 0.001 0.062 0.612 0.806 0.002 0.066
[0.43] [0.37] [0.94] [0.79] [0.47] [0.36] [0.98] [0.80] [0.43] [0.37] [0.97] [0.80]
Variables Included in Equation:
  Regional dummy no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes
  Time dummy no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
RI PI PRI






























F-test statistic for joint
significance of instruments in
    Note: Figures in parentheses are the absolute values of t-statistics. Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are significant at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) levels, respectively.
The sample size is 400. Due to limits on space, we do not report the results for the estimated coefficient of the dummy variables in the table.